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Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hospital: The Fourth
Circuit's Antitrust Analysis for Peer Review
Actions Under the Sherman Act
I. INTRODUCTION
"The basic federal antitrust law, the Shennan Act, 1 was
passed in 1890 against a background of rampant cartelization
and monopolization of the American economy."2 Congress
sought to correct what it thought was a market
defect-disparity and unfair trade practices. As a consequence,
section one of the Shennan Act prohibits concerted action that
imposes restraint on trade. 3 Section two prohibits the formation of monopolies as a result of unilateral conduct. 4
The plaintiff in Oksanen v. Page Menwrial, 5 Dr. Oksanen,
claimed that as a result of a peer review, which suspended
then revoked his staff privileges, he was prevented from practicing medicine at Page Memorial Hospital (''Page Memorial")
and that such constituted a violation of sections one and two of
the Shennan Act. 6 The scope of this note is limited to the allegation that Page Memorial and its medical staff conspired

1.
2.
3.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988).
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 23 (1976).

§ 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars
if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars,
or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
4.
§ 2. Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
5.
945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1991) (en bane), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 973 (1992).
6.
ld. at 702.
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against Dr. Oksanen resulting in an unreasonable restraint of
trade in violation of section one of the Sherman Act. 7
This note will employ four sections to analyze the Fourth
Circuit's position of extending the inter-enterprise immunity
doctrine 8 to hospital peer review under section one of the
Sherman Act. Section II presents a factual summary as well as
procedural synopsis of Oksanen. 9 In section III the Fourth
Circuit's rationale that:
1)

During the peer review process the medical staff acts
as the agent of Page Memorial and as such the intraenterprise immunity doctrine is applicable:

2)

"There are no strong antitrust concerns that would
warrant a departure from traditional concepts of agency since the hospital and the medical staff aren't competitors."10 Furthermore, "there is an overriding national need to provide incentive and protection for
physicians engaging in effective professional peer review:11

3)

The personal stake exemption does not apply since
there was only one doctor who practiced in overlapping
areas, and he wasn't even a member of the staff when
these problems occurred nor did he participate in the
peer review that suspended Dr. Oksanen:

is analyzed and questioned. In conclusion, section IV recapitulates that there is no need to extend intra-enterprise immunity
to peer group review in a hospital backdrop.

7.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
8.
The actions of a single enterprise are immune from the coverage of seetion
one of the Sherman Act. The inter-enterprise doctrine has extended this immunity
from violation of section one of the Sherman Act to cases in the business setting
where the alleged coconspirators have an agent/principal relationship. One such
case exists when a subsidiary and a parent company aet together to further their
business concerns. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752
(1984).
9.
945 F.2d at 696.
10.
!d. at 703 (citation omitted).
11.
!d. at 704, n.2 (citation omitted).
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FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL SYNOPSIS

Factual Summary

In 1978, Dr. Oksanen launched his career as a family practitioner in Luray, 12 Virginia. 13 He received full medical staff
privileges at Page Memorial 14 in 1979. 15
A short time after Dr. Oksanen received his medical staff
privileges, the hospital began to receive complaints about his
conduct. 16 These complaints continued to increase and it was
often reported that Dr. Oksanen addressed or referred to hospital employees and other professionals with profanity. 17
Dr. Oksanen often displayed his unprofessional attitude
through public and demeaning outbursts. These had a disrupting effect on the operation of the hospital. 18 For example, one
member of the Page Memorial staff was reported to have said,
"he has a volatile personality and you just don't know when it's
going to erupt." 19
Relations between Dr. Oksanen and other members of the
medical and hospital staffs deteriorated over time. In May

12.
Luray is located in Page County, Virginia and is comprised of 18,000
residents. !d. at 699.
13.
!d.
14.
Page Memorial Hospital (Page Memorial), a fifty-four bed institution, is the
only hospital in Page County. The organizational structure of Page Memorial,
which is similar to other hospitals, can be broken down into three sub-groups:
•Board of Trustees (Board) - The Board operates as the hospital's governing
body, and exercises final decision making authority on issues affecting Page
Memorial.
•Hospital Administrator - John S. Berry (Administrator Berry) is in charge of
day to day management of Page Memorial such as the supervision of the nursing
staff, laboratory personnel, and service providers.
•Medical Staff- The medical staff embodies all those physicians who have been
granted staff privileges. The medical staff is responsible for the process of peer
review. Peer review entails the members of the medical staff making recommendations to the Board as to whether a physician's privileges should be continued or
revoked. !d. at 699-700.
Page Memorial does not directly employ the medical staff. The relation between
the two consists of the hospital providing office space, an allowance for expenses,
and a facility where the staffed physicians may treat their patients needing
hospital care. !d. at 700.
15.
!d. at 699.
!d. at 700. For example, in October 1979, Administrator Berry received
16.
complaints from laboratory personnel involving Dr. Oksanen's mistreatment of
them.
17.
!d.
18.
!d.
19.
!d.
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1983, when Dr. Oksanen publicly reprimanded a nurse and her
supervisor concerning the care given to one of his patients, his
conduct had overstepped the bounds of professionalism. 20 Although the nurse tried to explain herself, Dr. Oksanen threw
down his charts and left the area. 21 It was this incident that
prompted the Hospital Administrator (Administrator Berry), in
accordance with the hospital by-laws, to request that the medical staff investigate the incident. 22 The medical staff recommended that no disciplinary action be taken against Dr.
Oksanen with regards to the nurse/Oksanen episode. 23
Later in 1983, the Board of Trustees (Board) distributed a
letter to the entire medical staff explaining Page Memorial's
need to seek a harmonious working environment. 24 Dr.
Oksanen stated that he found the letter demeaning and insulting.25 He wrote the Board that he would cooperate when it
had retracted its letter and a trustee had personally retrieved
the letter from his office. 26
As a result of Dr. Oksanen's reputation of arrogance and
the two above-explained incidents, the Board, at its July 12
meeting, "voted unanimously to request that the medical staff
take corrective actions against [Dr.] Oksanen.'m The Board
warned the medical staff that another refusal to take action
against Dr. Oksanen, would force the Board "to evaluate more
thoroughly [Dr. Oksanen's] hospital privileges during the annual credentialing process.''28
The medical staff subsequently revoked Dr. Oksanen's staff
privileges and Dr. Oksanen appealed their revocation to a Joint
Conference Committee ("Committee"). 29 The Committee recommended that at the very least Dr. Oksanen's privileges be
suspended. 30

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

25.

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d. at 701.
ld. The Joint Conference Committee (Committee) was comprised of Dr.

26.
27.
28.
29.
Ancheta, a member of the medical staff, and two members of the Board. The

Committee heard testimony from sixteen witnesses and Dr. Oksanen. ld.
30.

!d.

603]

ANTI-TRUST AND PEER REVIEW

607

In October 1983, Dr. Oksanen and his attorney argued
before the Board that his privileges not be suspended. 31 Irrespective of their arguments the Board voted nine to two, with
Dr. Holsinger abstaining, to suspend Dr. Oksanen's medical
staff privileges for two months, after which, his privileges
would be reinstated on a one-year probationary basis. 32 The
Board also directed other staff members to cooperate with Dr.
Oksanen during his probationary period. 33
Dr. Oksanen's privileges were restored and his probationary period began in January 1984. 34 Throughout the probationary period, both Dr. Oksanen and the medical staff traded
accusations that the other was failing to meet the requirements
set forth by the Board. 35 In addition, the Board continued to
receive complaints of Dr. Oksanen's disruptive behavior. 36
On May 8, 1984, the Board again requested that the medical staff take disciplinary action against Dr. Oksanen. 37 This
time the medical staff recommended that Dr. Oksanen's medical privileges at Page Memorial be permanently revoked. 38 On
June 27, 1984, before the Board had made a final determination in the disposition of Dr. Oksanen's staff privileges, he
resigned39 from the Page Memorial medical staff. 40

:n.
~i2.

Id.

!d. It should he noted that this suspension in no way affected Dr.
Oksanen's licensure in the State of Virginia.
:1a. !d. During Dr. Oksanen's two-month suspension he held a news conference
in which he asked for community support in his plight against Page Memorial.
During the news conference, he also questioned the competence of one of the
hospital's staff surgeons and alleged that the reason he was unable to place his
patients in the local nursing home was because Dr. Holsinger controlled the home.
As a result, a group of supporters campaigned to elect representatives to the
Board who would he more favorable to Dr. Oksanen-they managed to elect four
representatives from their ticket, including a replacement for Dr. Holsinger. ld.
~i4.
!d.
:iii.
!d.
:l6.
!d.
:17.
!d.
:i8.
!d.
39.
!d. at 702.
40.
Irl. at 702. After resigning Dr. Oksanen continued to receive staff privileges from nearby Shenandoah Memorial Hospital. In September 1984, the Virginia Board of Medicine initiated disciplinary proceedings against Dr. Oksanen which
culminated in a consent order reprimanding Dr. Oksanen for practicing medicine
without a valid Virginia license and for negligence in the death of a patient. !d.
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Procedural Synopsis

In 1988, Dr. Oksanen brought suit against Page Memorial
and its medical staff in federal district court for violations of
the Sherman Antitrust ActY The United States District
Court for the Western District of Virginia, held in summary
judgement, that there were no violations of the Sherman Act
and that as a matter of law the defendants may have lacked
the capacity to conspire. 42
Dr. Oksanen appealed to the
Fourth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals. 43 A panel of this circuit concluded that the defendants did indeed have
the capacity to engage in antitrust conspiracy. 44 The Fourth
Circuit reversed the grant for summary judgement and held
that Dr. Oksanen was not given an adequate opportunity to
take and receive discovery. 45
Upon rehearing en bane, the Fourth Circuit confirmed the
district court's hypothesis that the defendants may not have
the capacity to conspire. 46 The basis for the Fourth Circuit's
decision was the intra-enterprise doctrine, they felt it should be
extended to hospital peer review. 47
Ill.

ANALYSIS

As stated earlier, the scope of this note is confined to
Oksanen's allegation that Page Memorial and/or its medical
staff violated section one of the Sherman Act. 48 Dr. Oksanen
asserted that the revocation of his staff privileges and other
conduct by the defendants constituted a violation of section one
of the Sherman Act. 49 The following two subsections analyze
and criticize the court's rationale in holding that Page Memorial and the medical staff lacked the capacity to conspire in violation of section one of the Sherman Act. 50

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
bane),
47.
48.
49.
50.

!d.
ld.
Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 913 F.2d 73 (4th Cir. 1990).
!d. at 77.
!d. at 73.
Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 708 (4th Cir. 1991) (en
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 973 (1992).

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
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Conspiracy Under Section One of the Sherman Act

Application of section one of the Sherman Act is extended
only to those situations where there is evidence of a concerted
action. 51 The Oksanen court interprets this to require "evidence of a relation between two legally distinct persons or entities."52 "It is not enough that a single firm appears to 'restrain
trade' unreasonably, for even a vigorous competitor may leave
that impression."53 Section one of the Sherman Act is intended to reach only unreasonable restraints on trade 54 precipitated by contract, combination or conspiracy55 between distinct
and separate entities. 56
Therefore, to establish a violation of section one of the
Sherman Act, plaintiff must first show that commerce has
some how been affected. 57 This is the jurisdictional key that
gets the case in federal court. 58 Next, the plaintiff needs to
show the "existence of an agreement in the form of a contract,
combination or a conspiracy that imposes an unreasonable
restraint on trade."59 Dr. Oksanen contended that during the
peer review process, the hospital and the medical staff conspired to keep him from practicing at Page Memorial. 60

51.
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984). The
prima facie elements in a section one claim are:
1) Existence of a contract, combination or conspiracy
2) affecting interstate commerce
3) which imposes an unreasonable restraint on trade.
White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 504 (6th Cir.
1983).
52.
Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 702 (4th Cir. 1991) (en
bane), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 973 (1992).
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984).
53.
White & White, 723 F.2d at 504.
54.
55.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
56.
See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (demonstrating an
example of what constitutes "separate entities").
White & White, 723 F.2d at 504.
57.
ld. "Demonstrating that an alleged agreement would affect interstate com58.
merce [or commerce between the states and foreign nations] has been treated as a
jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a section one claim that must be satisfied
before the other two elements of such a claim can be addressed. See Summit
Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, _ U.S. _, 111 S. Ct. 1842, 114 L.Ed.2d. 366, 59 U.S.L.W.
(1991)." 945 F.2d at 702 (citing, White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply
Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 504 (6th Cir. 1983)).
59.
945 F.2d at 702 (citing, White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply
Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 504 (6th Cir. 1983)).
ld.
60.

610
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Dr. Oksanen claimed that the jurisdictional element is met
because among other things, "the hospital and its staff purchase supplies and receive insurance payments from out-ofstate sources and that they treat non-Virginia residents." 61
Therefore their actions have an effect on commerce. 62
Dr. Oksanen alleged that the peer review process constituted a conspiracy that imposed an unreasonable restraint on
trade. 63 First, "it was used as a vehicle to punish him for
sending patients to other area hospitals . . . ."64 Second, "[Dr.]
Oksanen argued that the peer review serves a gatekeeping
function so that an unfavorable review from Page Memorial
could affect his ability to obtain staff privileges at other hospitals."65

B.

The Fourth Circuit's Analysis of Oksanen

Dr. Oksanen maintains that the medical staff and the
hospital are distinct legal entities. 66 The Fourth Circuit, in
implementing the distinct entity test to this fact scenario, stated that the relationship between Page Memorial and the medical staff-as far as the peer review process-is one of principal
and agent. 67 The court then asserted that this relationship
was similar to the relationship covered by the umbrella of intra-corporate immunity as set forth in Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp.:
[O]fficers or employees of the same firm do not provide the
plurality of actors imperative for a § 1 conspiracy .... The
distinction between unilateral and concerted conduct is necessary for the proper understanding of the terms "contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy" in § 1. Nothing in the literal
meaning of those terms excludes coordinate conduct among
officers or employees of the same company. 68

Therefore the hospital and the medical staff are to be considered one indistinct entity when performing a peer review. 69

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 702-03 (4th Cir. 1991).
!d. at 703.
467 U.S. at 769.
945 F.2d at 703.
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Copperweld held that agreements between a parent company and a wholly owned subsidiary were not concerted actions
as defined in section one because the parent and the subsidiary
always have a unity of interests and hence their agreements
can not be considered a sudden joining of independent interests.70 The Fourth Circuit feels that a "similar unity of interest is present in the relationship between the hospital and its
staff', 71 and consequently held that Copperweld's functional
approach required the court to look beyond form and into the
substance of the relationship. 72
Although the Fourth Circuit concluded that technically the
hospital staff and the medical staff are two distinct legal entities, they held that when acting in the peer review process they
are in substance acting as one indistinct entity with a unity of
interest-increasing the quality of patient care-and that their
actions do not implicate the concerns of section one of the
Sherman Act. 73
Dr. Oksanen argues, that even if Page Memorial and the
medical staff comprise the same enterprise, the intra-enterprise
immunity doctrine is inapplicable because some of the doctors
had an independent stake in the outcome of the peer evaluation. 74 The court narrowly reads the personal stake exception
to extend only so far as the rationale underlying Greenville
Pub. Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc. 75 In Greenville, the defendant
company's president would directly benefit from the alleged
conspiracy, but in Oksanen, the only doctor whose practice

70.
467 U.S. at 752. Further the Supreme Court has expressed its dislike of
rules such as the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, that penalize coordinate
conduct "simply because a corporation delegated certain responsibilities to autonomous units might well discourage corporations from creating divisions with their
presumed benefits." ld. at 771.
71.
945 F.2d at 7ml. Both Page Memorial and the medical staff seek to
upgrade the quality of patient care. ld.
72.
ld. "Copperweld in fact criticized the notion that a corporation can conspire
with itself because this 'looks to the form of an enterprise's structure and ignores
the reality.'" ld. (citation omitted).
73.
945 F.2d at 704.
74.
ld. at 705. "This circuit has observed that an exception to the general rule
that a corporation cannot conspire with its officers or agents 'may be justified
when the officer has an independent personal stake in achieving the corporation's
illegal objective.'" ld. (citing Greenville Pub. Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d
391, 399 (4th Cir. 1974)).
75.
496 F.2d :191 (4th Cir. 1974). Here the court held that the president of the
defendant company was capable of conspiring with said company if he held an
interest in another company that competed with the plaintiff firm and that would
benefit if the plaintiff were forced out of the market. ld. at 400.

612
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might have directly benefited from Dr. Oksanen's expulsion
was Dr. Dale, and he wasn't admitted to the hospital until
August 1983 and he did not take part in the peer review leading to Dr. Oksanen's suspension. 76
The summation of the court's rationale for holding that
Page Memorial and the medical staff are incapable of conspiring during the peer review can be stated as follows:
1)

During the peer review process the medical staff acts
as the agent of Page Memorial and as such the intraenterprise immunity doctrine is applicable.

2)

"There are no strong antitrust concerns that would
warrant a departure from traditional concepts of agency since the hospital and the medical staff aren't competitors.'>?? Furthermore, "there is an overriding national need to provide incentive and protection for
physicians engaging in effective professional peer review.78

3)

The personal stake exemption does not apply since
there was only one doctor who practiced in overlapping
areas, and he wasn't even a member of the staff when
these problems occurred nor did he participate in the
peer review that suspended Dr. Oksanen.

C.

Conflict Among the Other Circuit Courts

Whether a hospital and its medical staff have the capacity
to conspire is at controversy among the different circuit courts.
There are those circuits that hold that a hospital and its medical staff lack the capacity to conspire when conducting a peer
review, extending some form of the intra-enterprise immunity
doctrine to the peer review process, thereby insulating the hos-

76.

!d.
77.
78.

945 F.2d at 70fi.
In any event, the more important aspect of Greenville for the purpose of
peer review is the degree of control the officer or agent with the independent interest exercised over the defendant firm's decisionmaking process. If the officer cannot cause a restraint to be imposed and his firm
would have taken the action anyway, then the independent interest is
largely irrelevant to antitrust analysis.

ld. at 703 (citation omitted).
!d. at 704 n.2 (citation omitted).
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pital and its medical staff from claims under section one of the
Sherman Act. 79
In Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, Nurse Midwifery
Associates brought an action against the hospital, its doctors
and a mutual insurer to recover for conspiracy in unreasonable
restraint of trade where the midwives were denied staff privileges at hospitals. 80 The Sixth Circuit stated that to establish
a violation of section one of the Sherman Act the plaintiffs
must establish that the defendants combined or conspired with
the intent to unreasonably restrain trade. 81 A section one
claim cannot be established by unilateral conduct. 82 The court
held that "[t]he [intra-enterprise] doctrine prevents a finding of
a conspiracy between a hospital and medical staff but in certain situations does not preclude a conspiracy among individual
members of a medical staff."83
In so holding, the Sixth Circuit found that a hospital and
its staff were analogous to a corporation and it officers or employees.84 Like a corporation where a relationship of principal
and agent exist, a medical staff when acting as the staff of the
hospital is acting as a quasi-agent and therefore is incapable of
conspiring with the hospital. 85
In Nanavanti v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hasp., Dr.
N anavanti, a board certified cardiologist, claimed that the hospital and the executive committee conspired against him in

79.
See Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1990),
amended, 927 F.2d 904, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991); Nanavanti v. Burdette
Tomlin Memorial Hosp., 857 F.2d 96 (8rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078
(1989).
80.
918 F.2d at 60fi.
81.
!d. at 611 (citing Smith v. Northern Mich. Hosps., 708 F.2d 942, 949 (6th
Cir. 19R8)).
82.
!d. (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,
768 (1984)).
!d. at 614. Furthermore, the court stated that:
83.
an agreement between officers or employees of the same firm does not
ordinarily constitute a section 1 conspiracy, because officers of a single
firm are not separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests, so agreements among them do not suddenly bring together economic
power that was previously pursuing divergent goals. Coordination within
a firm is as likely to result from an effort to compete as from an effort
to stifle competition. In the marketplace, such coordination may be necessary if a business enterprise is to compete effectively . . . .
!d. at 612 (citation omitted).
84.
!d. at 614.
!d.
85.

614
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violation of section one of the Sherman Act. 86 Dr. Nanavanti
alleged that the hospital and the executive committee had
sought to "boycott Nanavanti's services in two ways: first, they
allegedly conspired to revoke his hospital staff privileges; and
second, they allegedly discourage doctors from referring cardiological patients to N anavanti." 87
The Third Circuit, citing Weiss v. York Hosp. ,88 stated
that a hospital could not conspire as an entity with its medical
staff on the grounds that the medical staff operates as an agent
for the hospital as would an officer of a corporation and has "no
interest in competition with the hospital."89 Therefore Tomlin
Memorial Hospital was not capable of conspiring with the executive committee. 90
The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, reasoned that
intra-enterprise immunity constitutes a necessary doctrine in
the world of business. 91 Without such a doctrine, every action
by an agent in the business world theoretically violates section
one of the Sherman Act. 92
The rule for corporations [(intra-enterprise immunity)] is
based on considerations unique to the corporate context. Theoretically, a "conspiracy" involving a corporation and one of
its agents would occur every time an agent performed some
act in the course of his agency, for such an act would be
deemed an act of the corporation. Thus, the rule that a corporation is incapable of conspiring with its agents is necessary
to prevent the erosion of the principle that section 1 does not
reach unilateral acts. A hospital and the member of its medical staff, in contrast, are legally separate entities, and consequently no similar danger exists that what is in fact unilateral activity will be bootstrapped into a "conspiracy". 93

86.
8fi7 F.2d 96 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. dented, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989).
lei. at 111.
87.
88.
74fi F.2d 786 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S 1060 (198fi).
89.
8fi7 F.2d at 118.
ld.
90.
91.
Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 819 (11th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960 (1990) (Physician whose medical staff privileges were
revoked brought action against the hospital, members of medical staff, and local
medical society for violation of federal antitrust laws). •
92.
ld.
93.
lcl. at 819.
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The Eleventh Circuit therefore held that "[t]o establish a
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must prove
that two or more distinct entities agreed to take action against
him." 94 The court found faulty the rationale that permitted
the extension of intra-enterprise immunity to peer review situations, and that there was no basis for ''holding that a hospital
is legally incapable of conspiring with members of its medical
staff."95 The Eleventh Circuit's bottom line is that the medical
staff and the hospital are indeed capable of conspiring with one
another. 96

D.

Criticism of the Court's Rationale

The first area of analysis in question is the application of
Copperweld97 to Page Memorial and its medical staff where
Oksanen is so easily distinguished. The medical staff is not a
wholly owned subsidiary of Page Memorial as were the facts in
Copperweld, nor does Page Memorial exercise the same degree
of control over the medical staff as does a parent company over
its subsidiary.
A subsidiary, as an entity, is always acting under the direction of the parent corporation, to hold such action a violation
of section one of the Sherman Act would effectively permit
section one to reach unilateral conduct. 98 Hospitals on the other hand do not exercise the absolute control over their medical
staffs as would a parent company over its subsidiary. Although
hospitals and their staffs may share a common interest it
should not be assumed that they have complete congruency of
interest and are acting as a single entity. A hospital merely
provides an environment where the doctors as independent
contractors can apply their trade. This type of arrangement is a
symbiotic relationship between distinct individuals, not an
agency relationship.
The Board of Directors of a subsidiary are fiduciaries to
the parent company and are under an obligation to maximize
shareholder value. The medical staff is under no obligation to

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

!d. at 81R.
!d. at 819.
!d.
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (19R4).
Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 819 (11th Cir. 1990).

616
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maximize revenues coming into the hospital. This is clear in
light of the facts that doctors often hold staff privileges at more
than one hospital. Were doctors held responsible to maximize
the incoming rents to the hospital then that requirement would
categorically prohibit them from seeking to hold staff privileges
at other hospitals.
Nor are doctors under any strict responsibility to effectively participate in any professional peer review. Sure, they may
be required to go through the motions of participation, but they
can not be forced to act in any certain way. Furthermore, they
receive no renumerations for their participation and are not
authorized to act as agents.
Considering the differences between the fact in Oksanen
and Copperweld and the distinct differences in the relationships between the two sets of alleged conspirators, there is
reason to believe that perhaps the doctrine of intra-enterprise
immunity should not have been extended to Page Memorial
and its medical staff.
Secondly, even if the intra-enterprise doctrine should be
extended in this case, the private interest exception could also,
in all fairness, be extended in Oksanen. It is true that Dr.
Oksanen's practice only overlapped one of the physician's on
the medical staff, and that that physician arrived after the
problems began and did not participate in the proceeding
wherein Dr. Oksanen was suspended. However, there is evidence that other members of the medical staff also had a private interest which they may have wished to protect by suspending Dr. Oksanen.
Doctors Horng and Ancheta were surgeons at the hospital
who may have had private interests in seeing Dr. Oksanen lose
his medial staff privileges. For instance, Dr. Oksanen questioned whether or not Drs. Horng and Ancheta knew the limitations of their expertise, and as a result Dr. Oksanen began
sending his patients to other hospitals for surgery. 99 The lost
revenue of these surgeons could easily provide for motive to establish a personal stake.
Lastly, the court could just as easily have ended with the
same result, that there was no section one violation, by applying the traditional two prong test as set forth in section one of
the Sherman Act. 100 Namely, was there a contract, combina99.
100.

945 F.2d at 700.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). The Fourth Circuit's rationale may have been moti-
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tion or conspiracy between the medical staff and Page Memorial that imposed an unreasonable restraint on trade.
There is clearly no objection to the first prong that the
defendants acted in concert, that may be assumed to be a given
in this case. Page Memorial and the medical staff did act in
concert to prevent Dr. Oksanen from practicing at Page Memorial. There is however no evidence that the concerted action
imposed an unreasonable restraint on trade. Dr. Oksanen was
already a staff member of another hospital that competed with
Page Memorial. They did not unreasonably restrict Dr.
Oksanen's ability to practice medicine in the Page County area.
It would have been unreasonable if Page Memorial had gotten
together with the other hospitals that Dr. Oksanen worked at
and jointly decided to black-ball him from practice. Here however, Page Memorial merely made a business decision that Dr.
Oksanen was not the type of doctor that enhanced the medical
staff and that the hospital would be better off without him.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The court's rationale in the paragraphs above the extension of the intra-enterprise immunity doctrine to peer review
evaluations should be reexamined for the reasons stated above,
namely:
• The relationship between a hospital and a medical staff are
very different from the relationship between a parent company and its officers of subsidiaries.
• The same result could have been reached had the Fourth
Circuit simply employed the standard two prong test, as
there was no evidence of an unreasonable restraint of
trade.
Therefore, the position of this Note differs from those circuits
that extend intra-enterprise immunity to hospitals and their
medical staffs, and sides with the Eleventh Circuit which held
that "[t]he rule for corporations [(intra-enterprise)] is based on
considerations unique to the corporate context .... A hospital
vated by the public policy concern of protecting evaluating doctors in the interest
of public safety. Were these doctors found to have conspired against Dr. Oksanen
the possible dampening effect on future peer group review could endanger the
patients of incompetent doctors.
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and the members of its medical staff . . . are legally separate
entities, and consequently no similar danger exists that what is
in fact unilateral activity will be bootstrapped into a
'conspiracy ."' 101

Christopher Laurent

101.

Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 819 (11th Cir. 1990).

